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JOINT EMPLOYER EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: WILL THE
REAL N.L.R.B. PLEASE STAND UP
Charles S. Birenbaum*
I. INTRODUCTION
When legal theory is misapplied or departs from reality, parties
subject to the law suffer. Planning and counseling become contrived
in an attempt to conform to unrealistic legal principles. This article
addresses legal theory under the National Labor Relations Act' and
the National Labor Relations Board's' standards for asserting juris-
diction when an employer maintains close ties to an entity that is
exempt from the Act's coverage. As will be shown, the legal theory
applied by the Board in this area is unfocused and often disregards
the operational complexities and business purposes involved in joint
business ventures. Application of traditional legal principles under
the Act provides a workable solution.
Section 1 of the Act states that the purpose of the NLRA is to
guarantee employees freedom to associate, thereby minimizing indus-
trial strife between "employees" and "employers." Section 2(2) de-
fines the term "employer" under the Act:
The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the
United States or any wholly owned government corporation, or
any federal reserve bank, or any state or political subdivision
thereof, of any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other
than when acting as an employer), or any one acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.'
Although section 2(2) excludes certain entities, the Board retains dis-
© 1984 by Charles S. Birenbaum.
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1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
2. Hereinafter the "Board."
3. 29 U.S.C. § 2(2).
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cretionary authority to assert jurisdiction over other private sector
employers. Section 14(c)(1) of the Act provides as follows:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or pub-
lished rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involv-
ing any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of
the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction:
provided, that the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction
under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.4
Pursuant to sections 2(2) and 14(c)(1), the Board frequently
treats two employers as one or as "joint employers" to administer the
Act.' Joint employer status results in the common liability of sepa-
rate business entities for unlawful conduct in which, for example,
one employer's discriminatory conduct will be attributed to its joint
employer.' For purposes of exempting employers from the Act's cov-
erage, however, the Board has not consistently applied its own joint
employer theory, thus giving rise to doubts about the Board's objec-
tivity in administration of the Act and posing difficulties for practi-
tioners who counsel clients on exemptions. The exemption issue runs
to the core of the Act and concerns the power of the Board to admin-
ister the Act fairly.
For example, the Board may assert jurisdiction over an em-
ployer closely related to an exempt entity to process a union's peti-
tion for election and to designate a "unit" of employees to vote in
such an election.7 Yet, if the exempt employer actually employs the
''unit" employees, in whole or in part, the issue arises whether the
Board has jurisdiction to conduct an election. In short, the Board
must decide whether or not to stay its own hand.
By examining those cases which primarily concern a private
sector employer's ties to the United States Government, this article
focuses on the confusion in current Board law on the appropriate
legal standard to apply in "shared exemption" cases. Traditionally,
4. 29 U.S.C. § 14(c)(1).
5. See L.E. Davis d/b/a Holiday Inn of Boston, 237 N.L.R.B. 1042, 1044 (1978), enfd
in part, 617 F.2d 1624 (7th Cir. 1980); Sakrete of Northern California, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B.
1220, 1222 (1962).
6. See, e.g., Hecks Properties, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 501, 501 n.3 (1982).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 159. The employer must bargain over mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing-wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment-with the lawfully selected
bargaining representative of unit employees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158(a)(5) and
158(d).
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the Board examines two private sector employers with close ties to
determine if they are "joint employers" and should be treated as one
entity for jurisdictional purposes. While it would be both simple and
reasonable for the Board to apply a "joint employer" test in shared
exemption cases, this has not been done. Rather, in such cases, the
Board has frequently refused employers the status ordinarily af-
forded them in cases where two private sector employers' liability is
at issue. The inequitable result: the Board asserts jurisdiction over
employers that should be fairly treated as one with their exempt
partners.
II. THE SINGLE EMPLOYER-JOINT EMPLOYER CONTINUUM
Exploration of shared exemptions necessitates examination of
the Board's joint employer theory. A tremendous amount of confu-
sion surrounds the Board's treatment of separate business entities
under the Act. The mix-up takes at least two forms: there is no clear
standard for determining the nature of two business entities and
whether they should be called "single," "joint," or "separate;" there
is no clear correlation between the nature of business entities, and
the effect their status has under the Act. Anyone litigating or plan-
ning under the Act must ask: (1) what is the employer-single, joint
or something else and (2) what difference does it make. A review of
the decisional law illustrates that no matter where two business enti-
ties fall on the single employer-joint employer continuum, the Board
treats them as one to assert jurisdiction no matter what test is ap-
plied to result in single or joint employer holdings.
A seminal decision on joint and single employer status is
Sakrete of Northern California.8 There, the Board decided that a
larger corporation clearly within the Board's jurisdiction qualified a
smaller company because they constituted a single employer. The
Board used the following test:
The Board often treats separate corporations as one employer
for jurisdictional purposes, where it is found that the firms, de-
spite their nominal separation, are highly integrated with re-
spect to ownership and operation. Some of the principal factors
which have been considered relevant in determining the extent
of integration are: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized
control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4)
common ownership of financial control.9
8. 137 N.L.R.B. 1220 (1962).
9. Id. at 1222. The Board has refined the Sakrete test by holding that no one factor is
19841
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The Board applied its test by finding that common ownership, ulti-
mate decision making authority of one man-the president of the
large entity-and "substantially parallel" conduct of business estab-
lished that the two companies constituted a single employer."
Historically, the Sakrete factors have been applied to find that
two business entities are joint employers-not just a single integrated
employer. In L.E. Davis, dibla Holiday Inn of Benton," the
Board decided that a restaurant and motel sharing a common situs in
a lessor-lessee arrangement were joint employers under Sakrete. The
entities presented themselves to the public as part of a Holiday Inn
facility under a single trademark, and served many of the same cus-
tomers." The restaurant and motel shared control over labor rela-
tions by virtue of the innkeeper's active participation in all collective
bargaining for both entities. 3 The record also contained evidence of
common management practices." The joint employer finding led the
Board to hold that the restaurant violated the Act by failing to honor
a collective bargaining agreement in effect for restaurant employees
prior to leasing. 5
In Parklane Hosiery Co.,"6 an administrative law judge, as af-
firmed by the Board, applied the Sakrete four-factor test to deter-
mine whether two entities satisfied the Board's jurisdictional stan-
dards under a section entitled "Joint Employer Contentions.' 7 The
judge decided that two businesses engaged in a franchisor-franchisee
relationship did not share common ownership, management, or con-
trol over labor relations and were not "integrated."' 8 These factors,
according to the judge, were the Board's "conventional joint em-
ployer criteria.'"" Nonetheless, the judge decided to assert jurisdic-
tion over both entities as "alter egos" because they exhibited a "unity
of interest;" to treat them separately would have permitted them
both to evade their statutorily prescribed legal duties to bargain
under the Act.2"
controlling; emphasis is on the first three factors, particularly, centralized labor relations.
Parklane Hosiery Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 597, 612 (1973).
10. Id. at 1222-23.
11. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1042.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1045.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 203 N.L.R.B. 597 (1973).
17. Id. at 612.
18. Id. at 613-14.
19. Id. at 614.
20. Id. at 615.
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In 1984, the Board decided to clarify the single employer-joint
employer analysis in TLI Inc. and Crown Zellerbach Corp.21 The
Board held that the common four-factor test "applies only after de-
ciding whether two separate companies constitute a single enter-
prise."'22 In contrast, "where two separate entities share or co-deter-
mine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment, they are to be considered joint employers for purposes
of the Act."'2 8 The Board further provided that there must be a
showing that a joint employer "meaningfully affects matters relating
to the employment relationship."2"
The Board's TLI decision implies that facts showing a closely
integrated relationship between two businesses will be analyzed
under Sakrete. Yet, a single employer finding under Sakrete is ex-
treme. The facts may show that two employers are something less
than a single entity; they may constitute two separate businesses
sharing control. As joint employers, the Board will still assert juris-
diction over them under TLI. Unresolved by the Board is why joint
employers appropriate for assertion of jurisdiction are not appropri-
ate for joint exemption when one entity cannot be compelled to com-
21. 271 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1984).
22. Id., slip op. at 3.
23. Id., citing NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982). In
Browning-Ferris, the Court decided that the four-factor test applied to establish a "single
employer" relationship when "two nominally independent enterprises, in reality, constitute
only one integrated enterprise." Id. at 1122. The Court distinguished the single and joint
employer concepts as follows:
In contrast, a "joint employer" concept does not depend upon the existence of a
single integrated enterprise and therefore the. . . four factor test is inappropri-
ate. Rather, a finding that companies are "joint employers" assumes in the first
instance that the companies are "what they appear to be"-independent legal
entities that have merely "historically chosen to handle jointly ...important
aspects of their employer-employee relationship". NLRB v. Checker Cab Com-
pany, 367 F.2d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 1122. The Browning-Ferris Court found that in a joint employer relationship, unlike in
a single employer case, "no finding of a lack of arm's length transaction or unity of control or
ownership is required." Id. The record need only show that two entities share or co-determine
a group of workers' essential terms of employment. Id. This could happen in a good faith
contracting relationship. Id. Thus, the Browning-Ferris standard for joint employer findings is
fairly lax compared to the four-factor test for single employer findings.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Sun-Maid Growers of Cali-
fornia v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1980), found that joint employer status exists "when
an employer exercises authority over employment conditions which are within the area of
mandatory collective bargaining." Id. at 59 (citing Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB 402 F.2d
525 (9th Cir. 1968)). Cf Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980) (endorsing application of the Board's factors).
24. Id. (citing Lacero Transportation & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 61, slip op. at 6
(1984)).
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ply with Board orders under section 2(2) of the Act.
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL STANDARD To DETERMINE
WHETHER AN EMPLOYER Is EXEMPT UNDER SECTION 2(2) OF
THE ACT
Presently, Board's standards for determining shared exemptions
under section 2(2) of the Act are, at best, confusing. The confusion
stems from a blurring of legal standards on separate statutory ques-
tions: (1) whether joint employer status exists where one employer is
an exempt institution under section 2(2);25 (2) whether an exempt
institution is actually the "true employer" of employees working for
the employer; 6 and (3) whether under section 14(c)(1), the Board
will exercise its discretionary authority on exemption matters.
It is clear under section 2(2) that the Board must not assert
jurisdiction over an employer who, as a joint employer, shares con-
trol of labor relations with an exempt institution because the exempt
institution cannot be compelled to bargain over terms and conditions
of employment. However, under section 14(c)(1), the Board may set
its own guidelines and standards for asserting jurisdiction over an
employer with ties to an exempt institution as defined in section
2(2)-usually contractors who perform a plethora of services, from
guarding government installations to administering job corps pro-
grams.2" Recent Board decisions have repeatedly confused these dis-
tinct questions, analyzing some fact patterns under section 2(2) and
others under section 14(c)(1), without explanation as to why one sec-
tion is invoked over the other. Further, the Board has failed repeat-
25. See NLRB v. Chicago Youth Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980); Lutheran
Welfare Services of Illinois, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979); ARA Services, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B.
64 (1975); Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973).
26. See Board of Trustees of the Memorial Hospital of Fremont County v. NLRB, 624
F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980); Mon-Yough Community Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Services, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1977).
27. See National Transportation Services, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
28. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Board must resolve the appro-
priate standard, but has drawn guidelines as follows:
As we recognized in [NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944)], the
terms 'employee' and 'employer' in this statute carry with them more than the
technical and traditional common law definitions. They also draw substance
from the policy and purposes of the Act, the circumstances and background of
particular employment relationships, and all the hard facts of industrial life.
And so the Board, in performing its delegated function of defining and
applying these terms, must bring to its task an appreciation of economic reali-
ties, as well as a recognition of the aims which Congress sought to achieve by
this statute ....
NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403, reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 868 (1947).
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edly to confront the fundamental question of whether joint employer
status even exists in such cases.
A. The National Transportation Service, Inc. Test
In National Transportation Service, Inc.," the Board analyzed
whether it should assert jurisdiction over an employer "with close
ties to an exempt entity."80 The Board maintained that the proper
standard is as follows:
[W]e shall determine whether the employer itself meets the defi-
nition of "employer" in [slection 2(2) of the Act and, if so, de-
termine whether the employer has sufficient control of the em-
ployment conditions of its employees to enable it to bargain with
a labor organization as their representative. 31
Further, the Board noted that under section 14(c)(1) of the Act,
which establishes its discretionary authority, the Board has tradition-
ally utilized a two-prong test. First, it analyzes whether a private
employer retains sufficient control over its employees' terms and con-
ditions of employment so as to effectively bargain with the employ-
ees' representative. Second, where the employer retains such control,
"the focus of necessity is on the nature of the relationship between
the purposes of the exempt institution and the services provided by
the non-exempt employer"-the "intimate connections" test.82
The Board decided that the intimate connections prong of the
test under section 14(c)(1) of the Act was too ambiguous and vague to
apply and, therefore, was no longer to be utilized. 8 The Board de-
clared that under National Transportation, the only appropriate
test under section 14(c)(1) is the "degree of control" exercised over
terms and conditions of employment by the employer in dispute.3 4
The decision in National Transportation has created total con-
fusion in the shared exemptions arena because there no longer ap-
pears to be any distinction between the analyses under section 2(2)
29. 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
30. Id. at 565.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584, 586 (1975)).
33. Id. at 565-66.
34. Id. The Board subsequently abandoned other nonmonetary tests similar to the "inti-
mate connections" test in favor of its National Transportation analysis. See, e.g., Wordsworth
Academy, 262 N.L.R.B. 438 (1982) (the Board will no longer utilize the "adjunct test," under
which the Board asserted jurisdiction over an employer "adjunct" to a "public system"); Soy
City Bus Services, 249 N.L.R.B. 1169 (1980) (the Board will no longer utilize the "local-in-
character test," under which the Board refused to assert jurisdiction over an employer which
performs only local, community services).
19841
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and section 14(c)(1). Contemplating the troubles ahead, the dissent-
ing members noted:
The majority erroneously chooses to characterize the Board's re-
fusal to assert jurisdiction over such employers as an exercise of
its discretion under [slection 14(c)(1) of the Act. Rather, the
Board has found in these cases that the employer shared the
exemption of a governmental body from our jurisdiction."
The dissenting members' position is in accord with the joint em-
ployer theory. Logically, an employer who exhibits a joint employer
relationship with an exempt entity must be treated as one with the
exempt entity and share the exemption from Board jurisdiction
under section 2(2). Yet, as a result of National Transportation, both
the courts and the Board now look to a nebulous degree-of-control
test without regard to the issue of joint employer standing, the dis-
tinctions between section 2(2) or section 14(c)(1), or any distinctive
precedent under the separate sections of the Act. 6
Confusion over the proper standard is exemplified by Board de-
cisions. In Educational and Recreational Services, Inc. ,7 the Board
considered whether a busing company that contracted with a county
school district retained sufficient control over the employees' employ-
ment conditions to enable it to engage in meaningful bargaining.
The Board decided that the exempt school district exercised substan-
tial control over employment under National Transportation, noting
that the school district was in fact a joint employer of the employer's
employees.38
The Board's decision in Educational and Recreational Ser-
vices, Inc. indicates that an analysis under National Transporta-
tion, and therefore under section 14(c)(1) of the Act, implies joint
employer status under section 2(2). s" The Board now regularly cites,
35. 240 N.L.R.B. at 567 n.12.
36. Commentators note confusion in analysis of shared exemption cases post-National
Transportation. See, e.g., Kiss, The Effect of National League of Cities on the Political Sub-
division Exemption of the NLRA, 32 LAB. L.J. 786, 790 (1980): "Due to the similarity of the
factual inquiry, the difference between the control test and the joint employer test has been
confused and often disregarded."
37. 263 N.L.R.B. 972 (1982).
38. Id. at 974 (citing Educational and Recreational Services, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 448
(1982) and ARA Services, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 64 (1975)).
39. See also Michigan Eye Bank, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 1377 (1982) where the Board dis-
missed an election petition insofar as it included employees whose terms and conditions were
controlled by an exempt entity, a public university. Id. at 1377 n.2. The Board apparently
accepted the employer's argument that the university was a joint employer of that particular
class of employees, meriting a shared exemption under section 2(2). Id. Unfortunately, the
Board cited Slater Corporation, 197 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1972), a one-page decision, for precedent.
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without explanation, the National Transportation decision to sup-
port findings under section 2(2) of the Act. "0 As a result, there is no
way to tell whether the Board is exercising discretionary authority,
or alternatively, is determining whether or not an employer is statu-
torily exempt under section 2(2) of the Act by virtue of the fact it is
a joint employer with an exempt institution.
Moreover, since the Board based National Transportation on
section 14(c)(1), the fate of the intimate connections test under section
2(2) is unclear. Commentators caution that since National Trans-
portation was a decision under section 14(c)(1) of the Act, there is
no way to tell whether the Board still utilizes the intimate connection
test under a section 2(2) joint employer analysis. 4 ' Therefore, until
the Board makes clear which test is applicable, employers must con-
tinue to request that the Board analyze a shared exemption issue
under both section 2(2), utilizing the intimate connection test in con-junction with a joint employer argument, and section 14(1)(c), osten-
sibly under the degree of control test.
The confusion between exempt status under section 2(2) in con-
trast to that under 14(c)(1) was further accentuated in Champlain
Security Services, Inc.. 2 Citing National Transportation, the Board
refused to use the intimate connections test to analyze whether a se"
curity service guarding a Coast Guard installation pursuant to a gov-
ernment contract should share the government's exemption. On the
surface, the Board appeared to base its decision on its discretionary
authority under section 14(c)(1). Yet, the Board has said that it will
automatically assert jurisdiction under its discretionary authority
when an employer's services have a substantial impact on national
defense.'
d. Slater Corporation was an "intimate connections" case which is now in question after
National Transportation.
40. E.g., Greater Framingham Mental Health Ass'n, 263 N.L.R.B. 1330 n.15 (1982);
The Mental Health Ass'n of North Central Massachusetts, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 38 (1981);
Champlain Security Services, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 755, 766 (1979).
41. Hart, When Will Contractors With Political Subdivision Be Deemed To Share Po-
litical Subdivision's Exemption Under The National Labor Relations Act Under Section 2(2)(29 U.S.C. § 152(2)), 54 A.L.R. FED. 619, 624-625. See also Michigan Eye Bank, 265
N.L.R.B. at 1337 n.2 (1982), which cites Slater Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1972), a decision
utilizing the "intimate connections" test.
42. 243 N.L.R.B. at 755.
43. Castle Instant Maintenance/Maid, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 130, 131 (1981), enforced
without opinion, 95 Lab. Cas. (CCH) D 13796 (9th Cir. 1982); Trico Disposal Service, Inc.,
191 N.L.R.B. 104 (1971); Readi-Mix Concrete and Materials, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 318, 320
(1958). A review of the relevant precedent reveals that the substantial impact on national
defense standard displaces the Board's own discretionary-monetary inflow/outflow rules, but it
has nothing to do with a statutory exemption under section 2(2) of the Act. See, e.g., Young
1984]
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The Board's failure to harmonize these lines of cases is another
example of the Board's failure to properly clarify legal precedent. If
the Board in Champlain Securities Services, Inc. was truly looking
to a section 2(2) analysis, it should have cited a joint employer case,
and no conflict between discretionary theories would have arisen.
B. Confusion Regarding the Proper Test to Apply in Shared Ex-
emption Cases in the Circuit Courts of Appeal
The most thorough examination of shared exemption status and
joint employer theory is set forth in a series of decisions in Herbert
Harvey, Inc..44 The case was initiated when a union filed a petition
for election under section 9(c) of the Act.4 Harvey was engaged in
Bryant d/b/a Fort Sam Houston Beauty Shop, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (1984), Castle Instant
Maintenance/Maid, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. at 131; Pentagon Barber Shop, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B.
1248 (1981); Tayko Industries, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 84 (1974), enforced in pertinent part, 543
F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1976); J.J. Cook Construction Co. and Empire Building Corp., 203
N.L.R.B. 41 n.2 (1973); Trico Disposal Service, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 104; Beisder Aviation
Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 399, 415, 441 (1962); Carteret Towing Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 975, 976
(1962), enforced, 307 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1962); Hazelton Laboratories, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B.
1609 n.1 (1962); Canal Maris Improvement Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1333 (1961); McFar-
land 131 N.L.R.B. 745 (1961), enforced, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962); Tri-Associated Dry-
wall Contractors Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1961); Midwest Piping Co., 127 N.L.R.B.
408, 419 (1960); Texas Zinc Minerals Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 603, 607 (1960); Geronimo Ser-
vice Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 366, 367 (1960); Gray, Rogers, Graham and Osborne, 129 N.L.R.B.
450 (1960), enforced, 295 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1961); Local Union No. 188, United Ass'n Jour-
neymen and Apprentices (Peacock Construction Co.), 124 N.L.R.B. 323, 324-25 (1959);
Readi-Mix Concrete and Materials, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. at 320.
44. 159 N.L.R.B. 254 (1966), supplemented, 162 N.L.R.B. 890 (1967), rev'd and re-
manded, 385 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1967), on remand, 171 N.L.R.B. 238 (1968), enforced,
424 F.2d '770 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
45. See infra note 7. Section 9(c) states in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such reg-
ulations as may be prescribed by the Board -
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor or-
ganization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees
(i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer de-
clines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in subsec-
tion (a) of this section, or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization,
which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as
the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsec-
tion (a) of this section; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organi-
zations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative
defined in subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an
officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommenda-
tions with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing
N.L.R.B. JURISDICTION
the business of management and operation of apartment buildings in
the District of Columbia and supplied building maintenance services
to the World Bank pursuant to a contract executed in 1955. The
contract was renewed yearly and was expanded to include new
buildings acquired by World Bank. Under a cost-plus-fixed-fee ar-
rangement, Harvey was paid a monthly fee and was reimbursed for
all direct costs incurred in rendering the services required under the
contract.46
The contract required that Harvey secure written approval by
the Bank for any expenditures exceeding the contract's stated
amount. All supplies and materials purchased became the property
of the Bank. Harvey paid employee wages, sick leave, and vacation
pay from an advance provided by the Bank. Benefits such as group
hospitalization and workers' compensation were covered by the same
advance. Harvey made all deductions for income tax and contribu-
tions to the Social Security system. Harvey controlled hiring, but
clearance from the Bank was required whenever an applicant's ac-
ceptability was at issue. Harvey's supervisors could recommend the
discharge of employees, but the discharges were not effective until
reviewed by Harvey's management and the Bank. Harvey complied
with Bank recommendations on hiring and firing when such were
made.4
7
The Board found that although conditions of employment were
subject to review and approval by the Bank, Harvey retained suffi-
cient control over terms and conditions of employment to effectively
bargain. Thus, the Board found that Harvey was an "employer"
under section 2(2) of the Act and directed an election.48
The union won the election, and Harvey refused to bargain.
The Board found that Harvey's refusal was an unfair labor practice
under sections 8(a)(1) and (5)41 of the Act.50 On review of the Board
that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret
ballot and shall certify the result thereof.
46. 159 N.L.R.B. at 254.
47. Id. at 255.
48. Id. at 255-56.
49. Section 8(a)(1) states that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [siection
[7] of this title." Section 7 states as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
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order to bargain with the prevailing union, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the Board's
decision.5
The court found that the Bank and Harvey were joint employ-
ers and stated, "the question becomes whether the labor board erred
in directing one of the joint employers to bargain with the union,
when it had no jurisdiction over the other employer."52 The court
stated that the Board impliedly recognized the Bank's exempt status
and the possible conflict by finding that Harvey was "an employer"
instead of "the employer." ' The court noted that if the Board found
that the World Bank had the dominant role in the employer combi-
nation, any agreement made by Harvey as a result of negotiations
would have been subject to veto by an entity which cannot be or-
dered to bargain. Accordingly, the court remanded to the Board to
decide whether the Bank was an exempt institution and whether to
assert jurisdiction over both employers as joint employers.54
On remand, the Board accepted the court of appeals's finding of
joint employer status, but only as the "law of the case." 5 The Board
further decided that, as an entity involved in the "delicate field of
international relations," the World Bank was an exempt institu-
condition of employment as authorized in section 18(a)(3)] of this title.
Section 8(a)(5) makes an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the lawfully selected
bargaining representative for employees under section 9 an unfair labor practice. See infra
note 7.
50. Herbert Harvey, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 890 (1967).
51. Herbert Harvey, Inc., 385 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
52. Id. at 685-86.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. In a concurring opinion in Herbert Harvey, Inc. Judge McGowan stated as
follows:
But the World Bank is what it is, and I wonder whether the Board would assert
jurisdiction over it if it had not contracted out its maintenance needs. If the
Board would not, then I wonder whether petitioner, as an employer providing
service similar to those supplied other exempted institutions and on similar
terms, is not being treated differently to a degree that approaches the arbitrary.
The joint employer concept, if applicable, would presumably mean that two
persons are subject to the act rather than one. It does not appear to me to imply
that, if one of such two is an exempt institution, the other must invariably be
treated as exempt also unless the Board chooses to do so.
Id. at 686-87. Accordingly, Judge McGowan recognized that asserting jurisdiction over one
joint employer means forcing another into the sphere of private sector bargaining even though
the decision is within the Board's authority. He further stressed that consistency in the area
was necessary. Id. Treating the employers as one for purposes of declining to assert jurisdic-
tion would be consistent, especially since treating joint employers differently "approaches the
arbitrary." Unfortunately, the final sentence quoted in Judge McGowan's opinion is contrary
to the purpose and application of joint employer theory.
55. Herbert Harvey, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. at 238, 239 (1968).
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tion.56 Although a joint employer relationship existed, the Board
found that Harvey still retained sufficient control over working con-
ditions to bargain collectively with the union. The basis for the
Board's finding was a contract provision between Harvey and the
World Bank which held Harvey solely liable for the acts of its em-
ployees. The Board stated that the parties' intent was for Harvey to
retain its independence. The Board noted that the Bank reserved no
contractual rights to determine wage rates, set hours of work, dis-
charge or hire, or otherwise control conditions of employment. The
Board further noted that although Harvey was compensated by a
fixed sum, there were no limitations on wage rates in the contract.
Participation by the Bank in certain decisions such as hiring and
firing, according to the Board, was understandable in light of the
service contract nature of the parties' relations.5
On review for the second time, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia agreed with the Board's decision and accepted
the Board's finding on joint employer status as only the "law of the
case." 58 It further concluded that the Board had properly analyzed
whether one joint employer had the dominant role in setting condi-
tions of employment. Accordingly, the court deferred to the Board's
"expert" conclusions on the joint employer relations involved.5 9
Unfortunately, this series of Herbert Harvey, Inc. decisions fails
to clarify the appropriate standard in shared exemption cases. Al-
though the joint employer concept was properly raised, it was the
court of appeals that initiated the analysis. Even then, the joint em-
ployer analysis was ultimately limited to the "law of the case" and
was not stated as a rule of general applicability. The final result in
Harvey permits the Board to ignore an exempt institution's veto
power and power of approval over critical decisions on mandatory
subjects of bargaining by finding that such relations are typical to a
service contract relationship. In short, the Board merely paid lip ser-
vice to a joint employer analysis in Herbert Harvey; on remand, it
analyzed the contractor's relationship with an exempt institution
under the same "degree of control" test applied under the Board's
discretionary standards pursuant to section 14(c)(1).
56. Id. at 238 n.7 (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)).
57. Id. The Board's decision also analyzed the "intimate connections test" now defunct
under National Transportation Services, and concluded that the employer's maintenance ser-
vices were unrelated to the World Bank's international finance business. Id. at 239-40.
58. Herbert Harvey, Inc., 424 F.2d 770, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
59. Id. at 779-80.
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The Herbert Harvey decision, based on a section 14(c)(1) anal-
ysis, runs counter to traditional joint employer theory. Under this
theory a finding of joint emplo'er status necessitates treating the two
employers as one regardless of their relative powers to alter labor
relations once the finding is made under either a four-factor test as
set forth in Sakrete6" or the less rigid standard adopted in TLI. 1
Neither the Board nor the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia in Herbert Harvey properly applied the Board's joint em-
ployer theory. Rather, the employers were treated separately for ju-
risdictional purposes, even though they were found to be joint
employers.
Confusion over the proper analysis to apply in shared exemp-
tion cases is further illustrated by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit decision in Zapex Corp. v. NLRB.6" A
principal issue in Zapex was whether the Board properly asserted
jurisdiction over companies that provided scientific and technical
support to the Combat Development Experimentation Command of
the United States Army."8 The court examined the contractual rela-
tions between the Zapex employer and the government to determine
whether the private sector employer retained freedom to control
terms and conditions of employment.64
The court noted that the relevant Supreme Court precedent was
NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co.," in which the Court decided "whether
private plant guards, who are required to be civilian auxiliaries to
the military police of the United States Army, are employees within
the meaning of [s]ection 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act." 66
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co. set out the
appropriate standard for review of Board determinations: a Board
decision "must be accepted by reviewing courts if it has a reasonable
basis in the evidence and is not inconsistent with the law." 7 The
Supreme Court upheld a Board determination that guards were em-
ployees under the Act because the evidence established that an em-
ployer-employee relationship clearly existed between the private sec-
tor employer and the guards. As auxiliary police, employees only
60. Sakrete of Northern California, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1220, 1222 (1962).
61. 271 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 3.
62. 621 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 330.
64. Id. at 330-31.
65. 331 U.S. 398 (1947), reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 868 (1947).
66. Id. at 399.
67. Id. at 403.
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deviated from their private employer's control in emergencies or in
purely auxiliary police matters.6 8 Plant management personnel had
exclusive authority to determine aspects of their employment as plant
guards.6" In fact, the War Department specifically reserved those
powers to the private sector employer. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court upheld a Board determination that the private sector employer
could bargain over the employees' plant guard job duties."
After discussing the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. E.C.
Atkins & Co., the court in Zapex then turned to the appropriate
Board law to determine whether there was a reasonable basis in the
evidence to enforce a Board order. However, the court could not
clearly determine what theory the Board used to assert jurisdiction.
The court noted that the Board sometimes found that asserting juris-
diction was inappropriate in shared exemption cases when there was
an "intimate relationship" between a private employer and an ex-
empt institution.71 Yet, the court further observed, "[w]hether this
inappropriateness rests on a finding of a joint employer situation or
on a discretionary abstention by the Board because of the intimate
relationship is not entirely clear."'7' The court was compelled to de-
cide the case by applying the "degree of control" analysis derived
from NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co. without resolving the confusion it
properly detected in the Board's decision in Zapex.7 3
Even several years after the National Transportation decision,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit still struggles with shared
exemption cases. In Museum Associates, v. NLRB,74 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was presented with the issue of
whether a museum was a governmental subdivision exempt from the
jurisdiction of the Board under section 2(2) of the Act. It was clearly
a statutory matter which did not involve discretionary standards of
review under section 14(c)(1). Yet, after noting that the degree of
control was at the heart of any test, the court stated that a govern-
ment-funded or regular employer will not be forced to engage "in a
mere exercise in futility" if it lacks sufficient autonomy over working
conditions to enable it to bargain efficiently with a union. In support
68. Id. at 407-08.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 413-15.
71. Zapex, 621 F.2d at 332.
72. Id. at 333.
73. Id.
74. 688 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1982).
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of that proposition, the court cited Rural Fire Protection Co., 5 the
very case apparently overruled by the Board in National Transpor-
tation for its use of the intimate connections test.
76
In short, the "degree of control" test, under any label, has been
misused. Although the Board may not openly admit as much, the
degree of control test has effectively been used to determine an em-
ployer's status under section 2(2) and under section 14(c)(1). This
confusion of tests has created inconsistent results. On the one hand,
under section 2(2)
[tihe NLRB has long held that if two or more employers
exert significant control over the same employees, they consti-
tute "joint employers" under the NLRA. Stoudt and Son, Inc.,
114 N.L.R.B. 838 (1955); Veta Mines, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 288
(1941). The Board has also held that it has no jurisdiction over
joint employers if one of the employers is exempt from the Act,
since a collective bargaining agreement is not feasible in such
circumstances. See, e.g., Mississippi City Lines, 223 N.L.R.B.
11 (1978); Transit Systems, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 299 (1975);
Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973). 7 7
On the other hand, when analyzing the degree of control exercised
by an exempt institution over terms and conditions of employment,
the Board rarely mentions joint employer or true employer status,
but instead regularly relies on National Transportation under the
Board's discretionary authority pursuant to section 14(c)(1). The
board's approach skews traditional joint employer jurisdictional
analysis: under joint employer theory, the Board need only find that
two employers co-determine or share control over certain major
terms and conditions of employment, most importantly, mandatory
subjects of bargaining under the Act.78 Once it is established that
two employers share in setting crucial terms and conditions of em-
ployment over which both employers would have to bargain, the de-
gree of control is irrelevant: the employers must be treated as one.
The state of the law demands clarification.
75. Id. at 1280 (citing Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584, 585-86 (1975)).
76. National Transportation, 240 N.L.R.B. at 565.
77. Lutheran Welfare Services of Illinois v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777, 778 (7th Cir. 1979).
78. See Sun-Maid Growers of California v. NLRB, 618 F.2d at 59; TLI and Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 3.
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IV. THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD FOR SHARED Ex-
EMPTION CASES UNDER SECTION 2(2) OF THE ACT
The degree of control test used to determine joint employers in
a shared exemption case under section 2(2) is not as stringentas the
degree of control test exercised by the Board under its National
Transportation decision and related cases. In fact, if the degree of
control necessary to satisfy National Transportation is present, then
the exempt institution may actually be the true employer, not simply
a joint employer. As a result, the critical foundation for the degree of
control analysis in shared exemption cases is in section 2(2) under
joint employer law. As the dissent in National Transportation prop-
erly noted, by switching sections of the Act to determine shared ex-
emption cases, the Board effectively abandoned all precedent. In or-
der to make sense of its own prior decisions, the Board must return
to the section 2(2) umbrella in accord with joint employer precedent.
Any analysis of joint employer finding in shared exemption
cases under section 2(2) must address Ohio Inns, Inc.7 "9 There, the
Board decided whether it should assert jurisdiction over a lodge op-
erating pursuant to a concession contract with the State of Ohio in a
state-owned park. Under the contract, the state had to approve prices
for admittance to the cabins and guestrooms, food, beverages, en-
tertainment and amusement. The state controlled the lodge em-
ployer's hours of operation and all phases of promotion and public-
ity. The manner and form of records and accounting used by the
employer were directed and approved by the state. The state re-
quired detailed reporting to it by the employer and could enter on
the premises at any time to determine if the employer was operating
properly. If the employer failed to follow any state directives, to cor-
rect any deficiencies, or to meet any obligation under the contract,
the state could terminate the contract at will."0
Concerning labor relations, the state in Ohio Inns, Inc., had the
authority to approve or disapprove labor policies, including wage
rates, and contractually retained the power to force the discharge of
any employee it deemed to be incompetent, disorderly or unsatisfac-
tory. The state in fact discharged individuals under the contract.
Further, the employer complied with all state hiring requests. The
state also participated in training programs to instruct employees on
how to efficiently serve customers in the employer's dining room.
Thus, the Board decided that the sum total of contract powers and
79. 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973).
80. Id.
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
supporting evidence indicated that any collective bargaining agree-
ment would have to be approved by the state to be effective. 8 '
Turning to the appropriate law involved, the Board found that
"the state is at least a joint employer here."'82 Thus, because the state
was exempt from Board jurisdiction under section 2(2) of the Act,
the Board would not assert jurisdiction over the employer.8 3 Oddly,
the Board arrived at its conclusion even though both parties in the
proceeding requested that the Board assert jurisdiction.84 The strong
policy against asserting jurisdiction over joint employers when one is
exempt rests not only in the exemptions specifically set forth in the
statute, but in the Board's rationale that it cannot resolve representa-
tion or unfair labor practice issues unless it is "in a position to effec-
tively require full compliance [with the Act]." '85 If the Board as-
serted jurisdiction, the state's power of disapproval regarding critical
terms and conditions of employment could create a conflict between
government authorities in unfair labor practice proceedings in the
future. Such conflicts would frustrate the Board's administration of
the Act.86
81. id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 528-29.
84. Id. at 529 n.3.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. The Board discussed the Ohio Inns, Inc. doctrine in subsequent cases in which it
asserted jurisdiction under section 2(2) of the Act. See, e.g., Bishop Randall Hospital, 217
N.L.R.B. 1129 (1975), enforcement denied, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980); Buffalo General
Hospital, 218 N.L.R.B. 1090 (1975). In Bishop Randall Hospital, the employer had exclusive
control over its personnel with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms
and conditions of employment. Therefore, the Board found a basis for collective bargaining
existed. 217 N.L.R.B. at 1130. In denying enforcement of the Board's decision in Bishop Ran-
dall Hospital, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the hospital was an
exempt political subdivision under section 2(2) of the Act, and, at the very least, a joint em-
ployer with the government. 624 F.2d at 188-89. The court based its decision on continuing
dialogue between the hospital administrator and government trustees of the hospital concerning
wage rates, fringe benefits and staffing. The evidence revealed that the trustees approved the
administrator's wage rate decisions and the hospital complied with proposals on other terms
merely "suggested' by the trustees. Id. at 187-88. Therefore, the government's trustees partici-
pated enough in setting terms and conditions of employment through "dialogue" and "sugges-
tions" to merit a finding on joint employer status.
In Buffalo General Hospital, the employer, who claimed an exemption pursuant to rela-
tions with a county government, was free to hire regardless of whether the county disapproved
of an individual's credentials or salary range. In addition, the employer set all wage rates, and
there was no historical example of county disapproval of wage rates selected. All facilities were
owned by the employer. Furthermore, the county had no right to inspect the employer's prem-
ises or to police any purchases of supplies or equipment by the employer. 218 N.L.R.B. at
1091. Accordingly, the Board asserted jurisdiction over the employer notwithstanding its ties to
the county.
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Another leading case that discusses the proper standard of re-
view for shared exemption cases under section 2(2) of the Act is
ARA Services, Inc.87 There, the Board was presented with the issue
of whether it should assert jurisdiction over a private employer that
provided automotive fleet maintenance services for approximately
one-half of a county government's vehicles. The contract between the
parties dictated the hours the employer was to remain open, the vari-
ous classifications of employees and the number of employees in each
classification, the appropriate wage rates, the reporting requirements
of the employer, the manner in which the employer obtained parts
and supplies, maintenance and repair programs the employer was
required to establish, holidays and vacations and other benefits for
employees and the method of compensation. It further directed "that
the extent and character of the work to be done by the contractor
shall be subject to the general control and approval of the contracting
offices [of the county].")8 8
The ARA contract also required that the employer maintain
preferential hiring treatment for county residents applying for jobs.89
The county had open access to the employer's personnel files, books,
records and other files. Furthermore, the county reserved the right to
approve employees before they were hired by the employer and to
request dismissal of employees. The county also reserved the right to
make unannounced on-site inspections of the employer's facilities as
it deemed necessary.9" In practice, the county maintained a personnel
director who oversaw operations by inspecting and checking records
and operations.9" Based on the record, the Board found that the em-
ployer was a joint employer with the county and shared the statutory
exemption enjoyed by the county under section 2(2) of the Act.92
The United States Courts of Appeals have also applied the joint
employer doctrine under section 2(2) independent of the Board's de-
87. 221 N.L.R.B. 64 (1975).
88. Id. at 64-65.
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. See also Toledo District Nurse Ass'n, 216 N.L.R.B. 743 (1975) (pre-National
Transportation decision which utilizes joint-employer analysis under section 2(2)). In ARA
Services, Inc., the government exercised control by "reserving" authority. If the government
actually administered labor relations to control operations with the assistance of the contractor,
the government would not only be a joint employer, but the true employer under section 2(2)
of the Act. Mon-Yough Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services, 227 N.L.R.B. 1218,
1219 (1977). Thus, under ARA Services, Inc., the reservation of power to set labor relations
policy or oversee operations is sufficient evidence of joint employer relations.
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gree of control test under its discretionary authority.9" In fact, in
Lutheran Welfare Services of Illinois v. NLRB94 the court found it
unnecessary to make a detailed review of control to determine joint
employer status. There, the court found that the employers that op-
erated child-care facilities in Chicago under federal Head Start and
Day Care programs, with the bulk of funding administered by a
local agency, shared the government's exemption under the Act. The
court rejected the Board's argument that the government did not
have substantial control over labor relations of the employers because
the relationship between the employers and the government was
"primarily contractual."9 5
Instead, the court pointed out that the employers classified em-
ployees and set their salaries in accordance with government policies;
the employers were required to obtain government approval for hir-
ing, promotions, wage or merit increases, fringe benefits, and to set
working hours; the employers were required to prepare a policy pro-
cedure manual for the government; the employers were required to
submit organizational charts and evaluation reports; and the employ-
ers' directors were supervised by government personnel.9 6 Those fac-
tors alone convinced the court that the employers shared joint em-
ployer status with the government necessary to exempt the employers
under section 2(2) of the Act. 97
V. THE SECURITY SERVICES INDUSTRY: PROTECTING JOINT
EMPLOYER STATUS
Board decisional law on shared exemptions in the security ser-
vices industry illustrates the soundness of the joint employer theory
and the vagueness of the degree of control test. Prior to its decision
in National Transportation, the Board decided National Detective
Agencies,98 followed by Champlain Securities Services, Inc.99
In National Detective Agencies, Inc., the Board determined that
an employer providing security guards for two international institu-
tions, a bank, and a development fund, shared those institutions' sec-
93. See Board of Trustees v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 189 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Chicago Youth Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980); Lutheran Welfare Services of Illinois
v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979).
94. 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979).
95. Id. at 778.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 237 N.L.R.B. 451 (1978).
99. 243 N.L.R.B. 755 (1979).
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tion 2(2) exemption. 00 Overruling a Regional Director, the Board
found that both international institutions retained a substantial de-
gree of control over significant aspects of the employment relation-
ship, because the institutions were concerned not only with the
guards' quality, but also with minute details of daily operations, in-
cluding the image the guards presented to customers.? 1
Specifically, the Board emphasized contract provisions which re-
served to the exempt institutions power to control the exact services
to be performed by guards, their hiring, training, compensation, re-
placement and shift scheduling. In one instance, the exempt institu-
tion screened all applicants for hire and issued minimum perform-
ance requirements. Guards were provided for permanent assignment,
but the institution had the power to alter the number of required
security personnel. Furthermore, although the employer was obli-
gated to assign guards and receptionists of superior quality to the
exempt institution, the institution had the express right to immedi-
ately remove any unsuitable individual." 2
Most importantly, the Board in National Detective Agencies
found that the exempt institutions controlled the guards' wage rates.
One exempt institution had negotiated with the employer for express
contract provisions governing wage rates. The other institution indi-
rectly determined wage rates by "suggesting" rates which the em-
ployer adopted. Additionally, the employer was contractually re-
quired to document and submit to the institution any wage rate
changes required by local law as well as to agree in writing to any
rate adjustment due to any increase in employee benefits, insurance
and "other necessary and reasonable administrative expenses."' 0 3
Relying upon ARA Services, Inc., °" a joint employer case, the
Board correctly held that the employer in National Detective Agen-
cies could not effectively bargain with a union over the minute de-
tails of employment actually controlled by the exempt institutions."'
100. 237 N.L.R.B at 453.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 452.
103. Id.
104. 221 N.L.R.B. at 64.
105. 237 N.L.R.B. at 453 n.4. In contrast to the decision in National Detective Agen-
cies, Inc., the Board in Atlas Guard Service, 237 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1978), another pre-National
Transportation decision, found that a guard contractor retained sufficient control over employ-
ees contracted to the General Services Administration (GSA) of the United States government
to enter into a meaningful bargaining relationship. There, the GSA instituted only certain
Department of Labor regulations for wages and fringe benefits and required minimum levels
of training as well as minimum legislative requirements on age, citizenship, experience, educa-
tion and physical condition. Additionally, the GSA retained the power to fire a guard for
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Champlain Securities Services, Inc.'0 6, a 1979 case, appears to
have been incorrectly decided. There, the employer provided security
services to protect a Coast Guard installation on Governor's Island,
an island owned by the government. The government's contract with
Champlain mandated that the employer maintain a training pro-
gram for employees, defined job duties, set health, height, weight,
vision and grooming requirements, required United States citizen-
ship and fluency in the English language and mandated supervisory
requirements.1 07 Further, the employer had to report to Coast Guard
liaison officers who monitored performance under the contract. The
Coast Guard provided all equipment to the employer and had the
express power to terminate employees.' 08 The Board stated that the
employer controlled hiring,"0 9 but obviously the employer could not
employ anyone who failed to meet Coast Guard requirements, in-
cluding successful completion of the Coast Guard-mandated training
program.
Nonetheless, the Board overruled an Acting Regional Director's
decision that the employer shared the Coast Guard's exemption
under section 2(2) of the Act. The Board based its decision on Na-
tional Transportation under section 14(c)(1), finding that the em-
ployer could bargain over some terms and conditions, and therefore
incompetence or inefficiency. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1067-68. However, the private employer in
Atlas supervised employees through a district manager located in a government building where
employees worked. The district manager exclusively interviewed, hired, fired, laid off and de-
termined individual work assignments. Moreover, the employer arranged and paid for training
programs for employees and controlled shift differentials, pay scales, vacation time, and the
method of payment and fringe benefits above those mandated by the Department of Labor.
The Board also found that the president and general manager of the employer were in charge
of labor relations. The Board asserted jurisdiction over the employer, because, according to the
Board, it exercised enough control over the guards' employment to enter into a meaningful
bargaining relationship. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1067-68.
Atlas Guard Service made no mention of joint employers nor even cited a joint employer
case. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1067-68. Reservation of powers to terminate employees and force com-
pliance with regulations or other employment matters is evidence of centralized labor relations.
Inspection rights and frequent reporting requirements could show common management. Shar-
ing equipment and facilities could show interrelation of operations. Without proper joint em-
ployer analysis in the Board's decision, it is difficult to determine the proper outcome of the
Atlas case. Thus, the Atlas Guard Service decision is an example of the Board's failure to
apply the proper legal authority.
For application of the "intimate connections" test in the security services industry pre-
National Transportation, see The Wackenhut Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 86 (1973).
106. 243 N.L.R.B. 755 (1979).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 755-56.
109. Id. at 755.
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was subject to the Board's jurisdiction.11 The Board failed to raise
joint employer analysis anywhere in its decision.11'
If the joint employer theory is applied to the facts in Cham-
plain Securities, exemption for the security contractor appears ap-
propriate. Under Sakrete,1 2 the Coast Guard satisfied the most im-
portant factors exhibiting single employer status: operations were
interrelated because the Coast Guard owned all facilities, including
the island where employees worked, and provided all work equip-
ment; management supervisory requirements were dictated by the
Coast Guard in the contract and were under the purview of Coast
Guard liaison officers; labor relations were centralized on major
terms of employment such as training, hiring requirements, termina-
tions and job duties, all controlled by the Coast Guard. Similarly,
under TLI,"' the evidence was more than sufficient to merit a joint
employer finding: the Coast Guard and Champlain co-determined
essential terms of employment. Accordingly, Champlain should have
shared the Coast Guard's exemption as a single employer, or, at the
very least, as a joint employer.
Further confusing the Board's decision in Champlain Securities
Services was the Board's citation to Singer Co." 4 The Board, by
analogy, relied on Singer Co. to support a finding that the cost-plus-
fixed-fee agreement in Champlain Securities did not exhibit enough
control by the government over the employer to merit a shared ex-
emption under the Act. Yet, inspection of Singer Co. and the line of
cases upon which it relies reveals that it, too, fails to cite or rely on
any joint employer precedent.
110. Id. at 756-57.
111. See also Loma Prieta Regional Center, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1979), which
suffers from the same defect as Champlain Securities Services, Inc.: the case nowhere raises
joint-employer issues, instead analyzing the section 2(2) issue under National Transportation
Service rather than Ohio Inns or ARA Services.
112. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1220.
113. 271 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 3. Cf NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S.
398 (1947), where employees in effect held two entirely separate positions. As private plant
guards, the employees' terms and conditions of employment were administered entirely by the
private sector employer; as auxiliary military police, a job which functionally had nothing to
do with employee plant guard duties, the employees were subject to War Department regula-
tion. Id. at 407-08, 413-15. In Champlain Security Services, the employer actually contracted
to perform a government function, to protect government facilities and personnel. Naturally,
government controls on an important function such as protecting a military base are more
stringent, including controls on the individuals who perform the function. In its zeal to avoid
applying an "intimate connections" test to the facts of Champlain, the Board neglected its
traditional and relevant joint employer analysis, which mandates an exemption for the
employer.
114. 240 N.L.R.B. 965 (1979).
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In Singer Co., the Board scrutinized the relationship between
the employer, which operated a residential job corps center in De-
troit, and the Department of Labor (DOL)." 5 The contract between
the employer and the DOL was a cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangement." 6
The Board conceded that the DOL had tremendous control over la-
bor relations:
DOL must approve the Employer's selection and retention of
key staff members (none of whom are in the unit sought), salary
ranges and job descriptions for all positions, the kind and num-
ber of employee fringe benefits and the amount of money availa-
ble therefore, changes in the number of employees in each job
classification and changes in employee wages when such
changes exceed ten percent.""
The contract also required the employer to notify the DOL of labor
disputes which could affect the employer's operations." 8 Nonethe-
less, the Board found that the employer alone was responsible for
hirings, firings, promotions, demotions and transfers of employees in
the unit." 9 The Board stated that the employer could agree to cer-
tain terms and conditions, such as seniority systems that govern
wage increases, promotions, shift assignments for overtime, job bid-
ding procedures, a system of progressive discipline, or grievance pro-
cedures. 2 Thus, the Board, with two members dissenting,'' as-
serted jurisdiction over the employer.' 22
In deciding that the employer exercised enough freedom to bar-
gain under its contract with the DOL, the Board overruled Teledyne
Economic Development Co.,' 23 which established that a similar cost-
115. Id.
116. Id. Under a cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangement, a contractor receives a fixed sum and
is reimbursed for additional expenses approved by the government or other contracting party.
See Reynolds Corp., 74 N.L.R.B. 1622, 1630-32 (1947), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 168 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1948).
117. 240 N.L.R.B. at 966.
118. Id. at 965.
119. Id. at 966.
120. Id. Importantly, the Board pointed out that the employer in Singer Co. maintained
a collective bargaining agreement for a separate unit of employees covered by the DOL con-
tract. Id. Therefore, the Board had bargaining history to guide its determination. Nonetheless,
as properly pointed out by the dissenting members, the employer did not contest jurisdiction
over the employer for the petition for election of the other unit and voluntarily submitted to a
Board-conducted election; voluntary submission does not waive the employer's right to contest
jurisdiction on a separate petition for different employees. Id. at 967-68.
121. Id. at 967, (Members Penello and Murphy dissented).
122. Id. at 967. Accord Teledyne Economic Development Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 1216
(1982); Management and Training Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1152 (1982).
123. 223 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1976).
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plus-fixed-fee contract indicated a substantial degree of control over
terms and conditions of employment to merit a shared exemption
under the Act. In overruling Teledyne, the Board cited two cases
involving shared exemptions under section 2(2) of the Act: Catholic
Bishop of Chicago124 and Hull House Association12 Those cases,
which dealt with government control over Head Start and Day Care
Centers under contract with Model Cities, a local government
agency, are overshadowed by the decisions of the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Chicago Youth Centers,12 and
Lutheran Welfare Services of Illinois v. NLRB.12 7 Neither of the
Board decisions dealt with joint employer analysis nor cited joint em-
ployer precedent. In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals in
Lutheran Welfare Services of Illinois v. NLRB reviewed the Board's
decision denying a shared exemption for similar programs adminis-
tered by Model Cities in Chicago. The Court refused to enforce a
Board order because the Board failed to follow its own joint em-
ployer precedent.' 28
The line of cases leading to Singer Co., including Reynolds
Corp. 29, a major decision, are not supportive of the Board's reason-
ing.' 30 In Reynolds Corp., the employer was engaged in the manu-
facture of naval weaponry under contract with the Navy. The plant,
facilities, equipment, raw materials and finished products were at all
times the property of the Navy.'' The Board found that the em-
ployer operated the plant under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, and
"determined the methods of manufacture, hired the supervisory staff
and the employees, determined their wages, hours and working con-
ditions, directed their duties and functions, paid their salaries and
trained, promoted, demoted and discharged them."' 2 The employer
was solely responsible for labor relations at the plant, and the naval
commanding officer could only "suggest" matters to the employer.
The only controls exercised by the Navy relevant to the case were
124. 235 N.L.R.B. 776 (1978).
125. 235 N.L.R.B. 797 (1978).
126. 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980).
127. 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979).
128. Id. at 778.
129. 74 N.L.R.B. 1622 (1947), enforcement denied on other grounds, 168 F.2d 877
(5th Cir. 1948).
130. See American Smelting and Refining Co. (Colorado Plateau Uranium Ore Pro-
ject), 92 N.L.R.B. 1451 (1951); Great Southern Chemical Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1951);
Reynolds Corp., 74 N.L.R.B. 1622; United States Cartridge Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 191 (1942).
131. 74 N.L.R.B. 1626.
132. Id. at 1630-31.
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strict supervision to ensure that the employer complied with the con-
tract and approval of all purchases in excess of $500.'
Reynolds Corporation argued that it was not an employer
within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act, but was merely an
agent for the true employer, the government."" The Board rejected
this argument, citing Supreme Court precedent holding that contrac-
tors with the government are not agents or instrumentalities suffi-
cient to share in sovereign immunities reserved to the federal govern-
ment." 5 None of the cases relied upon by the Board in Reynolds
Corp. involved the National Labor Relations Act or addressed the
issue of whether a private sector employer controlled by the govern-
ment should be forced to collectively bargain with a union. 3 For
example, the Board specifically discussed a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Bell v. Porter.'37
The Bell v. Porter decision was under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and also failed to address collective bargaining under the National
Labor Relations Act.
Agency under legislation other than the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is not relevant to government control over employment,
joint employer status, or the freedom to bargain without government
constraint. Singer Co. and Reynolds Corp. simply fail to support the
notion that a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract somehow dispels the gov-
ernment's power over a contractor's labor relations and
operations.' 8
Finally, the Board in Singer Co. relied on National Transpor-
133. Id. at 1631.
134. Id. at 1632.
135. Id. at 1632. See also cases cited therein, id. at n.12.
136. Id. at 1632 n.12 (citing Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U.S. 261
(1943) (application of state milk price legislation to federal contractors); Alabama v. King and
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) (application of state taxation laws to federal contractors); James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (application of state occupation tax to federal
contractors)).
137. 159 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1946).
138. Interestingly, the Board views cost-plus contracts differently in traditional em-
ployer analysis. In Dining and Kitchen Administration, 257 N.L.R.B. 325 (1981), enforce-
ment denied, 676 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1982), the Board affirmed an administrative law judge's
decision that treated a cost-plus contract as evidence of common management. The judge rea-
soned that the strict reporting requirements which permit a contracting party to scrutinize
operations showed common management, thus militated in favor of establishing joint employer
relations. Id. at 331. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the contract was actually
evidence of a subcontracting relationship rather than a joint employer relationship. 676 F.2d at
913. Since cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts often have strict reporting requirements, the Board
should assess that evidence under the common management "factor" of single employer analy-
sis. See Sakrete of Northern California, 137 N.L.R.B. at 1222.
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tation to deny application of the intimate connections test.' 9 The
Board did not mention either section 2(2) or section 14(c)(1) in con-
nection with its denial, and there is no way of knowing whether the
Board was addressing the intimate connections test as it applies to its
discretionary authority or to mandatory statutory exemptions.
In short, Singer Co. is not useful authority here, especially as
cited for support by analogy in Champlain Securities Services.
Singer Co. put undue emphasis on the existence of a cost-plus-fixed-
fee agreement without applying a joint employer analysis based on
sound Board precedent. As indicated in the earlier discussions on
joint employer status and the reasoning of such cases as Ohio Inns,
Inc., government control raises the spectre of conflict between gov-
ernment agencies, which may frustrate the Board's attempt to de-
mand full compliance with the Act. Singer Co. never addressed the
issue of an inability to require full compliance under the Act. The
Board merely found that the ability to control certain terms and con-
ditions was enough and ignored potential conflicts through the gov-
ernment's reserved powers over other major terms and conditions.
Therefore, the precedential value of Singer Co., lacking any joint
employer analysis, is highly questionable.
If joint employer analysis is applied to the facts in Singer Co., a
strong argument for exemption results. There was no question, and
the Board conceded, that the DOL shared control over major terms
and conditions of employment: wages, benefits, job duties and man-
ning requirements were dictated by the government, establishing
centralized labor relations. Management was also controlled by the
DOL: the government controlled selection and retention of key staff
members, and a DOL project manager contacted the employer to
monitor operations an a daily basis.'"" The DOL exercised almost
total financial control over the employers operations. Under TLP 4 '
the Singer Company was clearly a joint employer with the DOL.
They arguably satisfy the single employer test. " 2 Accordingly, the
139. 240 N.L.R.B. at 967.
140. Id. at 967. The dissenting members pointed out that the DOL clearly controlled
day-to-day labor relations "indirectly." Id. They stated that the majority's search for "direct"
control was misplaced. According to the dissenting members, "[w]e prefer to base our decision
herein on substance rather than mere form." Id. In fact, as established in numerous other
Board decisions, it is sufficient if an exempt employer reserves authority to control labor rela-
tions. See National Detective Agencies, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 451 (1978); Ohio Inns, 205
N.L.R.B. 528 (1973); accord Bishop Randall Hospital v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir.
1980).
141. 271 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 3.
142. Sakrete of Northern Cal., 137 N.L.R.B. 1220, 1222 (1962).
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Singer Company should have been considered "one" with the DOL
for purposes of jurisdiction and thus, exempt under the Act.
IV. WILL THE REAL NLRB PLEASE STAND UP
The Board may remain on its present course and continue to
apply National Transportation in shared exemption cases, making
occasional reference to joint employer standing. Alternatively, the
Board may reinstate the joint employer analysis under section 2(2) to
determine whether an exempt entity and employer should be treated
as one under the Act, necessitating a shared exemption for joint em-
ployers. The former course is contrary to traditional joint employer
law and creates the appearance that the NLRB is willing to find
that joint employers are liable for each other's conduct in unfair la-
bor practice cases, but may not share each other's jurisdictional ex-
emptions from the Act's coverage.
Further, the National Transportation test ignores real and po-
tential conflicts between government entities when the Board cannot
obtain full compliance by a private sector employer partly controlled
by an exempt entity. In this regard, National Transportation and
its progeny directly contradict Ohio Inns, illustrating how the
Board's legal theory in this area has departed from the reality of
joint ventures. The potential conflicts between government entities in
shared exemption cases are overwhelming: if an employer is forced
to arbitrate the discharge of an employee who was terminated by the
government on national security grounds and an arbitrator orders
reinstatement, the employer could not comply with the award with-
out contravening a government mandate; if the Board orders an em-
ployer to bargain over wage rates which the employer has no power
to change without another government agency's approval, the gov-
ernment agency and the NLRB will contradict each other, leaving
the employer with no clear guidance on the proper resolution of the
conflict. These conflicts cannot be resolved by a prior Board decision
asserting jurisdiction based on an employer's ability to bargain over
a grievance procedure. The possible additional conflicts are infinite.
In contrast to the National Transportation test, joint employer
status is a long-standing, well-established concept. Joint employer
theory permits practitioners to counsel clients with close ties to an
exempt entity with greater predictability. In this regard, consistent
application of joint employer analysis will facilitate the resolution of
jurisdictional questions in shared exemption cases.
Additionally, as case law has established, the powers an exempt
entity reserves to itself or indirectly controls in a joint employer rela-
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tionship are crucial. It is the potential for conflict and the inability to
expect full compliance that create the touchstone of shared exemp-
tion analysis.
Even if the Board declines to apply a joint employer analysis
under the first step of National Transportation test regarding the
definition of an employer under section 2(2), a joint employer analy-
sis, rather than a degree-of-control test, should be applied to the sec-
ond step of the National Transportation analysis. In applying its
discretionary standards to assert jurisdiction, the Board must recog-
nize that joint employers, by definition, share control and power of a
business entity, most importantly, over its labor relations.
Finally, joint employer analysis would not ensure that every
government contractor escapes the strictures of the National Labor
Relations Act. The facts in Reynolds Corp. or NLRB v. E.C. Atkins
& Co. would not sustain a finding of joint employer relations since
labor relations control was reserved to the private sector employer.
Joint employer analysis would only exempt contractors who are in
fact in a joint employer relationship with an exempt entity.
To effectuate the purposes of the Act, preserve the Board's im-
partiality, and foster predictability in labor relations, the Board must
clarify its jurisdictional standards in shared exemption cases. The
failure to clarify jurisdictional standards will ensure continued con-
fusion and conflict in the roles of government entities, other entities
exempt from the National Labor Relations Act, private sector em-
ployers, unions and employees. The failure to clarify jurisdiction
standards also leaves the Board's neutrality in question: Why are
joint employers jointly liable and not jointly exempt from the Act?
To minimize industrial strife-a primary purpose of the Act-those
involved need guidance on their rights to invoke the Act. Application
of joint employer theory in shared exemption cases is a viable route
out of the current confusion under Board decisional law.
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